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"We Tibetans are looking for a legitimate and meaningful autonomy, an arrangement that would enable Tibetans to live within the framework of the People’s Republic of China."

Debating Tibet: A Reply to Michael Walzer

June 9, 2008

By Daniel A. Bell
Dissent Magazine
Winter 2008

Let me add a few thoughts to Michael Walzer's insightful comment "The
Tibetan Intifada." As Walzer says, one clear difference between Tibet
and Palestine is that a two-state solution is not possible in China,
nor is it requested by the Dalai Lama. But there are other
differences. The Chinese government has been pumping money into Tibet
rather than driving it into poverty: GDP has been rising an average
of 12 percent per annum since 2000, and incomes have also been rising
with double-digit growth recorded for both rural and urban residents
(see Ben Hillman, "Money Can't Buy Tibetans' Love", Far Eastern
Economic Review, April 2008). The problem is that development
projects have not always translated into opportunities for Tibetans
and there is an increased gap between economic expectations and the
social reality. But that is not to say Chinese "settlers" to Tibet
should be viewed as oppressors. They are largely poor farmers from
Western parts of China who migrate for economic reasons, and some
return "home" once they earn money (I realize that some settlers in
Palestine also go for economic reasons, but they are typically not as
poor and substantial numbers are also religious fanatics).

Perhaps the clearest disanalogy regards the numbers game. Israel
feels itself to be a relatively small and beleaguered country in the
midst of hostile territory, and it worries about its population being
marginalized relative to Palestinians. In contrast, there are less
than six million Tibetans (including areas outside of Tibet province)
and 1.3 billion Chinese. The closest analogies, to my mind, regard
nations, especially from developing countries, that have mistreated
minority groups perceived to be separatist forces: the Turks crushing
of Kurdish pleas for linguistic and ethnic autonomy, the
democratically-elected Russian government's brutality in Chechnya
(over 75000 civilians killed), and India's repression in Kashmir. One
might mention the mistreatment of aboriginal groups in the Americas.
As Fareed Zakaria puts it, "China's attitude towards Tibet is wrong
and cruel, but, alas, not that unusual" (Newsweek, April 12, 2008).

We can argue about the factual basis of some of Walzer's statements.
Walzer says that terrorism has never been "debated as a possible
strategy" but the exile group Tibetan Youth Congress has made
extremist statements keeping the option of violence open (even
lauding the Palestinians as their model). In fact, one of the reasons
for negotiating with the Dalai Lama now is that it will be harder to
control advocates of violence after he passes away. Also, Walzer says
that there is now a Han majority in Tibet, but if he is referring to
the province of Tibet the Tibetans are the majority group. Finally,
Walzer says that "most commentators" assume that the violence of the
repression has been greater, but if he is referring to the number of
people killed since the uprising in March 2008 there is no conclusive
evidence (thus far) that the number of people killed by Chinese
security forces is greater than the number of Chinese (mainly
civilians) killed by Tibetans on March 14. The whole Tibetan area has
been sealed off and we cannot get reliable numbers at the moment.

Regarding solutions to the problem, Walzer raises the point that
there is no opposition party in China. But I'm not sure if electoral
democracy would help, given that most Chinese seem to be distinctly
unsympathetic to the Tibetan cause. Freedom of the press is more
important because it would allow for informed debate of the issues at
stake. In fact, one article in the influential Chinese-language
Southern Weekly (April 2, 2008) by political analyst Cao Xin urges
pragmatic policy changes on the part of the Chinese government based
on the recognition of the reality of Tibetan Buddhism's powerful
influence among the Tibetan people and the Dalai Lama's influence as
the religious leader of Tibetan Buddhism. This article is unusual-- a
point of light in an otherwise uncompromising public discourse -- and
media openness would allow for more such articles that offer
different perspectives to leaders and intellectuals best poised to
bring about a change of policies in Tibet.

Perhaps the closest analogy with the Israeli/Palestinian dispute is
that the broad outlines of a solution seem obvious: a two-state
solution roughly along the lines of pre-1967 borders in the case of
Israel/Palestine and religious autonomy/cultural freedom under
Chinese sovereignty along with some sort of affirmative action
program for Tibetans (similar to what Malaysia did after communal
riots in the late 1960s when minority Chinese shopkeepers were forced
to hire Malays from the majority community).

What is missing is the will to implement these solutions. I actually
think there are more reasons to be optimistic -- or maybe I should
say less pessimistic -- in the case of Tibet. The Dalai Lama is a
moderate leader with moral authority who can bring his followers into
line, and the Chinese Communist Party has some progressive elements
that have promoted more tolerant minority policies in the past (as in
the 1980s under Hu Yaobang) and may do so in the future (see Willy
Lam, "Hope for a Better Tibet Policy", Far Eastern Economic Review,
April 2008). The CCP learned to act more reasonably in the case of
Taiwan—not overreacting in the case of provocations from
pro-independence forces and thus paving the way for better relations
-- and it may do so in the case of Tibet. Now that the negotiations
with the Dalai Lama's representatives seem to be back on track, we
can expect progress if both sides pragmatically strive for the end goal.

Daniel A. Bell teaches political theory at Tsinghua University. His
latest book is China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life
in a Changing Society(Princeton, 2008).
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