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"As long as human rights are violated, there can be no foundation for peace. How can peace grow where speaking the truth is itself a crime?"

11th EU-China Summit: A Revived EU Policy On Tibet

May 20, 2009

Submitted by the International Campaign for Tibet
Policy Paper addressed to the President of the
European Council, the President of the European
Commission, the High Representative for the EU
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Foreign
Affairs Ministers of EU Member States and the
President of the European Parliament
Brussels, 18 May 2009

A- Four Guidelines for a revived European policy on Tibet:
1. Coordinate national positions and adopt a clear EU policy on Tibet[1];

2. Adopt a common position that it is the right
of all EU Member States to welcome and meet with
the Dalai Lama in whatever manner they deem
appropriate, with the full support of all EU
Members and without interference or threats from
the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

3. Actively and concretely promote Sino-Tibetan negotiations;

4. Utilize all appropriate UN forums to press the
government of China on the situation in Tibet and
increase international coordination and cooperation.

B- At the EU-China Summit, press the Chinese
government to take the following steps:

1. Re-engage with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives in a results-based dialogue with
the intent of reaching mutually-agreeable solutions for Tibet;

2. Withdraw excessive security measures and end
repressive political campaigns in Tibet, provide
amnesty to Tibetans detained in connection with
incidents of peaceful protest since March 2008 to
the present day, commute death sentences for
Tibetans involved in March 14 riots in Lhasa and
ensure a fair trial and defense lawyers of their choice; and

3. Allow foreign diplomats, independent analysts
and journalists free access to Tibet.

China abruptly cancelled the 11th EU-China Summit
and the 5th EU-China Business Summit just before
December 1, citing the decision of then EU
President Nicolas Sarkozy to meet the Dalai Lama
in Poland a few days later. To underscore China’s
dissatisfaction with France, Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao a few weeks later declined to visit Paris
during his European mission to Germany, Spain, Brussels and the UK.

The lack of cohesion among European member states
on the issue of Tibet and conflicting national
approaches, especially on protocols for meeting
with the Dalai Lama, has left some states more
vulnerable as targets for Chinese government pressure.[2]

Recently, the Chinese government has stepped up
efforts to block meetings between the Dalai Lama
and national political figures, as illustrated
again by the recent pressure against the Dutch
Parliament in relation to planning for the June
2009 visit of the Dalai Lama.[3] By threatening
reprisals against EU countries whose leaders
welcome or meet with the Dalai Lama, the Chinese
government undermines its own position against
interference in the "internal affairs" of another state.

After Beijing’s rejection of the Memorandum on
Genuine Autonomy presented by the Tibetan side
during the last round of dialogue in November
2008 as "disguised independence," the Chinese
government has stepped up its anti-Dalai Lama
campaign in China and abroad. Chinese diplomats
and other spokespeople not only continue to
allege that the Dalai Lama seeks to "split the
motherland," but they additionally claim that his
vision of a future Tibet includes the expulsion
of non-Tibetans and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a fourth of China.

At the same time, Chinese authorities are
aggressively pursuing criminal cases against
Tibetans who participated in the demonstrations
that spread across Tibet last spring, without
regard for due process of law. A security
crackdown remains firmly in place and so-called
"patriotic education" threatens to exacerbate
tensions in Tibet. The Chinese government has
refused to respond to requests for access to
Tibet by UN rights monitors, foreign governments,
including the EU, and international human rights
nongovernmental-organizations, and there are
credible fears that gross violations of human
rights continue to occur, including the torture of Tibetans in detention.

Beijing has subverted and politicized
international forums where its human rights
record has been challenged and refused to answer
legitimate questions from European governments
about the use of lethal force against unarmed
protestors or the welfare of individual detainees.

The international community continues to urge
engagement to resolve differences, and both sides
have indicated that they are open to dialogue,
although the Chinese government insists on
various preconditions, including that the Dalai
Lama cease all efforts to internationalize the
Tibet issue, of which it considers his meetings
with foreign leaders to be an expression.

The intransigent and hardline Chinese position
reflects both misunderstanding of the Tibet issue
within the government and fear that genuine
autonomy is incompatible with the one-party
political system. In this light, even the fact
that the Dalai Lama refutes independence and
declares himself willing to achieve Tibetan
autonomy within the scope of the Chinese
constitution is insufficient. The active support
of a third party could provide the needed
perspective to remove obstacles and get the negotiating process moving forward.

A multilateral approach may be the only way to
compel China to move. The current approach of
various EU countries alternately cajoling and
criticizing China does not work. Without
coordination, EU countries are working at
cross-purposes and handing Beijing shallow public
relations victories and an ability to continue to
stall. As a first step, EU countries must forge a
consistent, unified Tibet policy. The EU should
then sit down with the United States, Japan and
other interested allies to begin to coordinate
efforts to help China and the Dalai Lama reach a
resolution. Clearly, the international community
wants to see a resolution for Tibet; it needs
everyone, not just China and the Tibetans, to make that happen.

A- Four Guidelines for a revived European policy
on Tibet The efforts undertaken so far by the EU
Council and its 27 member states and by the
European Commission are insufficient to address
the situation in Tibet. The EU should assess how
to adopt a coherent and coordinated EU foreign
policy on the sensitive question of Tibet and
should clarify and define its overall goals and
objectives on this issue as well as work with the
stakeholders to identify concrete steps that
could help Tibetans and Chinese find mutually acceptable solutions.

Even with regard to some helpful wording in the
last EU Report on Human Rights 2008[4], EU
statements should reflect a stronger, more
defined position in order to provide a meaningful
engagement on the issue of Tibet. For example,
the second EU statement on the March events in
Tibetan regions adopted on 29 March 2008[5]
includes the language: "The EU notes the Dalai
Lama’s recent public commitment to non-violence
and to autonomy not independence of Tibet." This
statement could have contributed to removing an
obstacle between the Chinese and Tibetans had it
underscored the consistency of the Dalai Lama’s
position by recalling his speech before the
European Parliament in Strasbourg two decades
ago, in 1988, when he announced that he was
seeking genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people
within the People’s Republic of China.[6]

The EU should be more vocal and use more often
public statement to send clear and firm messages
to Beijing. Closed door and quiet diplomacy such
as demarches and private discussion with Chinese
counterparts should be accompanied, when
appropriate, by clear public statements.

The European Commission and some officials from
member states maintain that they are doing all
that can be done on Tibet, but such a position
does not reflect the range of policy options at
the EU’s disposal. The EU’s position on Tibet has
generally been one of ambiguity and
accommodation, even in the face of gross human
rights violations. The EU is not doing all it can.

The European Parliament has played an important
role by condemning the deterioration of the human
rights situation in Tibet and by promoting a
peaceful resolution to the problem of Tibet.
However, these concerns have not been
sufficiently considered by other EU bodies and member states.[7]

The International Campaign for Tibet outlines 4
guidelines for an assertive European policy on
Tibet (each principle contains concrete recommendations):

1. EU countries should coordinate national
positions and adopt a clear EU policy on Tibet.

Start with a coordination meeting between the
United Kingdom, Germany, France and the EU Presidency.

The United Kingdom, Germany and France, together
with the EU Presidency, could start the process
by organizing a high-level consultation meeting
in order to clarify their respective positions on
Tibet, exchange views and agree on core elements
that could serve as a basis of a future common European approach on Tibet.

Nominate a Special Representative for China/Tibet
and/or establish a systematic dialogue between
EU’s High Representative for CFSP and Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister.

An EU special representative for China/Tibet
would be charged with converging the various
national policies on Tibet and have the mandate
to speak with one voice to Chinese authorities on
behalf of the EU. If this recommendation fails to
be implemented in the short term, the EU should
set-up a systematic political dialogue between
the SG/HR Solana and Chinese Foreign Affairs
Minister on some key EU-China issues, including Tibet.

Adopt a policy paper on sensitive EU-China
issues, including Tibet. Such a paper, to be made
public, would explain the position and goals of
EU Member states. The position of the EU on the
Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy[8] could
be included in such a paper or expressed in a
separate public statement. So far, only a very
limited number of European countries and leaders
have taken a public position on the Tibetan
Memorandum.[9] This Policy Paper should contain
clear and operational recommendations and could
serve as a reference and guiding document for EU’s Foreign Policy on Tibet.

Re-think the EU-China Human Rights dialogue and
better integrate human rights issues into other aspects of EU-China relations.

China has succeeded to an extent in containing
discussion on Tibet to the Human Rights Dialogue
and quiet diplomacy. Chinese authorities have not
been responsive enough to requests for
information on the cases of Tibetans imprisoned
for peaceful dissent from European governments
and have even refused to accept or respond to
lists provided by foreign official representatives.

As stressed by the EU on several occasions, "the
dialogue is an acceptable option only if enough
progress is achieved and reflected on the
ground"[10] The European Parliament in the Report
on Human Rights 2008 emphasized "the need for a
radical intensification and re-thinking of the
European Union-China human rights dialogue".[11]

The European Commission expressed in its 2006
Communication "EU-China: Closer partners, growing
responsibilities," that the dialogue "remains fit
for purposes but that the EU’s expectations [...]
are increasingly not being met." In this
framework the Commission has suggested that the
dialogue should be "more focused and
resultsoriented, with higher quality exchanges
and concrete results; more flexible, taking on
input from separate seminars and sub-groups;
better co-coordinated with Member State dialogues".[12]

FIDH and HRIC released a joint assessment of the
EU-China dialogue on human rights in December
2008.[13] They recommend in particular to:
"Increase the transparency and accountability of
the dialogue and seminar process by producing
regular assessments based upon the EU benchmarks,
supported by substantive indicators, and making
these assessments public." The EU should develop
clear benchmarks and indicators, which can be
publicly shared, in order to clarify decisions on
whether the dialogue is bringing sufficient and
real progress in human rights on the ground, or
whether other measures would be more effective.

2. EU countries should adopt a common position
that it is the right of all EU Member States to
welcome and meet with the Dalai Lama in whatever
manner they deem appropriate, with the full
support of all EU Members and without
interference or threats from the Government of the PRC.

Issue an EU statement on visit and meeting of the Dalai Lama in Europe.

The European Foreign Affairs Council proposed in
its Report on EU-China relations[14] that the EU:
"Issue a statement that EU leaders and
parliamentary authorities will not tolerate any
restriction on their right to meet political and
religious figures, including the Dalai Lama.
China’s ability to bully the EU on this issue has
been particularly harmful to EU unity". Such an
initiative could help to protect national
European member states as well as EU institutions
against Chinese pressure and would underscore EU
opposition to the erroneous and damaging official
position of the Chinese Communist Party in
characterizing the Dalai Lama as a separatist.

Consider inviting the Dalai Lama to a meeting of
the General Affairs Council. The Dalai Lama could
be invited to a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers
to present the Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine
Autonomy. An appropriate representative of the
Chinese government could be asked to comment on
the proceedings in a written statement and
specifically asked to find any area where a
consensus approach could be developed between the Tibetans and Chinese.

3. EU countries should actively and concretely
promote Sino-Tibetan negotiations. According to
the Envoy of the Dalai Lama for the dialogue,
Kelsang Gyaltsen (31 March 2009): "Since the
start of this dialogue in 2002, the Chinese side
has been adopting a position of no recognition,
no reciprocity, no commitment and no concession
and no compromise. Although they continue to
profess even to these days that the door to
dialogue is open, however, so far they have been
pursuing a strategy of avoiding any progress,
decision and commitment. This lack of political
will on the part of the Chinese leadership was
clearly demonstrated at the last round of
discussions that took place in November last year (2008)".[15]

The European Council on Foreign Relations16
suggests to the EU that it focus its relations
with China on human rights on four objectives,
one of which concerns the "Progression towards reconciliation in Tibet".

The EU has a long-standing and unique experience
in dialogue linked to crisis prevention and
management. Many of its experienced diplomats, if
tasked, could identify steps that could be taken
or obstacles that could be removed so that a
mutually agreeable solution for Tibet can be
reached. The EU could start the process by
sending an Emissary to Beijing tasked to
represent the EU Council in engaging with the
Chinese government and the Dalai Lama to collect
views of both parties, identify the obstacles and
suggest concrete recommendations to the EU
Council on how to overcome these identified difficulties.

4. EU countries should utilize all appropriate UN
forums to press the government of China on the
situation in Tibet and increase international coordination and cooperation.

Be more active on Tibet at UN Forums.

Over the past six months, China has continued to
politicize and subvert international forums where
its human rights record in Tibet has been
challenged. The Beijing authorities unequivocally
rejected the findings of the UN Committee against
Torture on the situation in Tibet; rejected all
recommendations made by EU states on Tibet at the
UN’s Universal Periodic Review and blocked
discussion of Tibet by NGOs at the UN Human
Rights Council. China has also been unresponsive
to official UN and Governmental requests for
greater transparency on the situation of missing
persons and detainees since the March 2008 unrest
in Tibet. This reflects not only intransigence by
the Chinese government, but also the failure of
will by the EU to challenge the Chinese
government on its failure to acknowledge legitimate international concern.

While some EU member states have been forceful in
questioning the human rights situation in Tibet
during sessions of the Human Rights Council,
other member states have failed to acknowledge
the issue. The EU can also press China at the UN
for access to Tibet for the various UN
independent experts, for example the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, and the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution.

Reinforce transatlantic and international coordination/cooperation on Tibet.

The EU should intensify its policy coordination
and information exchange on Tibetan issues among
key governments (Australia, US, France, Germany,
UK, Canada, India, Japan, Norway, New Zealand,
Czech Republic). For example, the former US
Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues launched
then regularly joined multilateral meetings in
Washington, D.C. This tradition should continue,
with the participation of the EU representative.

A good precedent of transatlantic coordination
was the 2008 EU-US Summit where partners agreed
on a common wording on Tibet inserted in the final statement.[17]

The Bern Process, which brings together countries
that have a dialogue with China on human rights,
should remain an important platform to exchange
information and national experience on how to
make progress with Chinese authorities on sensitive human rights issues.

Summit in Prague presents an opportunity for EU
leaders attending the meeting to appear united on
Tibet and to convince Chinese Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao and other Chinese leaders that specific
steps on Tibet can be taken that would benefit
EU-China relations. These steps should include:
1. The Chinese government should re-engage with
the Dalai Lama or his representatives in a
results-based dialogue with the intent of
reaching mutually agreeable solutions for Tibet.

The Tibetan side presented a comprehensive
document, the Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy,
giving specific details of their position to the
Chinese side at Beijing’s request during the last
round of talks. The Chinese authorities publicly
dismissed this document. However the memorandum
demonstrates a rigor and good faith effort by the
Tibetans and should be considered as a basis for future negotiations.

2. The Chinese government should withdraw
excessive security measures and end repressive
political campaigns in Tibet, provide amnesty to
Tibetans detained in connection with incidents of
peaceful protest since March 2008 to the present
day, commute death sentences for Tibetans
involved in March 14 riots in Lhasa and ensure a
fair trial and defense lawyers of their choice.

The Chinese government should end as a matter of
urgency the policies that provoke resentment
among Tibetans, including the imposition of de
facto martial law in Tibet; the imposition of the
death penalty in trials that do not meet minimal
international standards of justice; the
detentions, disappearances and killings of
Tibetans since the protests began in March
2008[18]; the ‘patriotic education’ and ‘strike
hard’ campaigns against Tibetans, and instead
seek to address the legitimate grievances of the
Tibetan people. Such measures take the place of
efforts to deal with real issues on the ground
and  exacerbate tensions among Chinese and
Tibetans and provoke instability throughout Tibet.

3. The Chinese government should allow foreign
diplomats, independent analysts and journalists free access to Tibet.

Chinese authorities have taken more systematic
measures to block information flow and access to
Tibet. Beijing declared that the Tibet Autonomous
Region was "opened up" to tourists to give
impression of normalcy but still restrictions are
in place and journalists and diplomats are still
not allowed free access.[19] EU members should
consider withholding visa entry to Chinese
officials from the Tibet Autonomous Region until
reciprocal and open access to Tibet is granted and respected.


The issue of Tibet is resolvable and the current
situation is urgent. The past year of protests
and crackdowns has transformed the political
landscape. The Dalai Lama has demonstrated a
consistent position and a good faith approach to
the dialogue. The Tibetan side has shown a rigor
in addressing key issues and in framing its
position in terms of the Chinese Constitution and
Chinese laws. Various major governments and
parliaments have shown an interest in moving the
dialogue forward to a mutually acceptable conclusion.

China is failing to act in accordance with
international human rights norms and seems unable
to move forward. The United Front Work Department
of the Chinese Communist Party has been
unresponsive as a dialogue partner with the envoys of the Dalai Lama.

There has been no direct engagement between the
Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership in 50 years.

On support for Tibet in Europe, the Chinese
government is taking a bullying approach that
exposes mismatched values, rather than elevating
the relationship. The EU approach should be
unified, advanced multilaterally, and framed in
the context of common interests. To continue to
equivocate on Tibet, after so many years of
support to the Dalai Lama, would be a significant
historic and moral mis-step, and against European interests.

About the International Campaign for Tibet

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) works
to promote human rights and democratic freedoms
for the people of Tibet. ICT does the following:

* Monitors and reports on human rights,
environmental and socio economic conditions in Tibet;

* Advocates for Tibetans imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs;

* Works with governments to develop policies and programs to help Tibetans;

* Secures humanitarian and development assistance for Tibetans;

* Mobilizes individuals and the international
community to take action on behalf of Tibetans; and

* Promotes self-determination for the Tibetan
people through negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama.

Founded in 1988, ICT is an international
non-profit organization with offices in
Washington, Amsterdam, Berlin and Brussels and
field offices in Dharamsala and Kathmandu.
Website: or

ICT Brussels | 11, rue de la linière | 1060 Brussels | Belgium
Phone: +32 (0)2 609 44 10 | Fax: +32 (0)2 609 44
32 |,

ICT US | 1825 Jefferson Place NW | Washington, DC | 20036
United States of America | Phone: (202) 785-1515
| Fax: (202) 785-4343 |

ICT Holland | Vijzelstraat 77 | 1017HG Amsterdam | The Netherlands
Phone: +31 (0)20 3308265 | Fax: +31 (0)20 3308266 |

ICT Deutschland e.V. | Schönhauser Allee 163 | 10435 Berlin | Germany
Phone: +49 (0)30 27879086 | Fax: +49 (0)30 27879087 |

1. The term "Tibet" in this memorandum is used to
refer to all Tibetan areas currently under the
jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China.
Note on geography: Tibet was traditionally
comprised of three main areas (Amdo -
northeastern Tibet), Kham (eastern Tibet) and
U-Tsang (central and western Tibet). The Tibet
Autonomous Region was set up by the Chinese
government in 1965 and covers the area of Tibet
west of the Yangtse River, including part of
Kham, and is sometimes referred to now as
"Central Tibet." The rest of Amdo and Kham have
been incorporated into Chinese provinces, and
where Tibetan communities were said to have
"compact inhabitancy" in thee provinces they were
designated Tibetan autonomous prefectures and
counties. As a result, most of Qinghai and parts
of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces are
acknowledged by the Chinese authorities to be "Tibetan."

2. The lack of European cohesion on Tibet can be
illustrated by the following examples: divergent
positions of European leaders regarding
attendance at the opening ceremony of the Beijing
Olympic Games; a lack of support and solidarity
between EU Member States in addressing the
Chinese response to high-level meetings with the
Dalai Lama (Chancellor Merkel in September 2007;
President Sarkozy in December 2008); issuing of
national public statements on Tibet without
consulting other EU partners; uncoordinated
closed-doors dialogue and discussion on Tibet
between Chinese diplomats and some European diplomats"

3. Letter of Chinese Ambassador ZHANG Jun to Mr
ORMEL, Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the Dutch Parliament, 9 April
2009: "(...) As you may be fully aware of, my
Government and I have clearly expressed our
opposition to the visit of the Dalai Lama to the
Netherlands in whatever name, not to mention his
meetings with Dutch leaders. As ambassador to the
Netherlands, I commit myself to the maintenance
of a sound bilateral relationship. It would be
unfortunate if we could not work together to
prevent the Dalai issue from evolving in a wrong
direction, and in particular it is against my
wish to see that our good relationship would be
hijacked by Dalai, the image of the Dutch
Parliament be tarnished by this visit and the
momentum of our bilateral relations in this
challenging time of global economic crisis be severely weakened by this issue."

4. Abstracts from the EU Report on Human Rights 2008:
- Section 2.6.1 Human rights dialogue with China:
"The EU voiced grave concern regarding the human
rights and humanitarian situation in Tibet
following recent events. China reiterated in
detail its customary position on the situation in
Tibet and the role of the Dalai Lama, while
noting that the door to further talks remained open.
- Section 6.6 Asia: The March 14 disturbances in
Lhasa and subsequent unrest in other areas
inhabited by Tibetans further tainted China’s
human rights record and made it the target of
international criticism. While it is clear that
serious violations of human rights were
committed, their full extent is difficult to
assess since Tibet was effectively sealed off.
The reported number of dead, wounded and detained
varies widely and there is continuing concern
about maltreatment and torture of detainees, the
absence of internationally guaranteed fair trial
rights and an intensified patriotic re-education
campaign. On 17 March the EU issued a public
declaration which, inter alia, called on the
Chinese Government to address the concerns of
Tibetans with regard to issues of human rights
and encouraged both sides to enter into a
substantive and constructive dialogue with a view
to reaching a sustainable solution acceptable to
all that would fully respect Tibetan culture,
religion and identity. Following international
pressure, two meetings have taken place between
the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the
Chinese authorities, but with few concrete results so far.

5. The first statement was adopted on 17 March 2008

6. The joint statement adopted by France and
China on April 1st 2009 which says that "France
refuses to support any form of "Tibet
independence" does not reflect and even
contradicts the Middle-way approach of the Dalai
Lama and his request for genuine autonomy, not independence.

7. Among the EP recommendations and messages
addressed to the EU Council, its 27 member states
and to the European Commission are:
-- the different resolutions adopted on Tibet (12
March 2009, 10 April 2008, 15 February 2007...)

-- the first recommendation of the EP 12th March
resolution on Tibet "urges the Chinese Government
to consider the Memorandum for Genuine Autonomy
for the Tibetan People of November 2008 as a
basis for substantive discussion leading towards
positive, meaningful change in Tibet, consistent
with the principles outlined in the Constitution
and laws of the People's Republic of China";

-- the 2008 Report on Foreign Relations in which
the EP "deplores the decision of the Chinese
authorities to end the talks with the
representatives of the Dalai Lama, and reminds
them the undertakings given after the tragic
events of March 2008 before the Olympic Games;
once again calls on the Council to appoint a
special envoy for Tibetan issues in order to
follow the situation closely and to facilitate
the resumption of dialogue between the parties";

-- the 2008 Human Rights report, in which the EP
"strongly condemns the crackdown against Tibetans
following the wave of protests that swept across
Tibet beginning on 10 March 2008 and the
repression by the Chinese government that has
increased in Tibet since then, and calls for the
restart of a sincere and results-oriented
dialogue between both parties based on the
"Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People".

8. "Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy for the
Tibetan People," submitted by the representatives
of the Dalai Lama during the 8th round of
dialogue on October 31, 2008, in response to a
request from the Chinese side in July for details
on the Dalai Lama’s autonomy plan

9. On March 29 in Beijing. Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s External Relations
Commissioner said she discussed Tibet in talks
with China’s Vice President Li Keqiang and
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi She said the Chinese
tone was less angry than before, but there was no
sign of any change in Beijing's hardline attitude
toward contact with the exiled Tibetan leader.
Referring to the "Memorandum of Genuine
Autonomy," Ferrero-Waldner said, "For a long
time, the Chinese wanted to see a written
position." - David Miliband commented on the
discussions taking place on Tibet between the
Chinese Government and representatives of the
Dalai Lama. In a Written Ministerial Statement
(29/10 2008) he said: "The Chinese Government has
said that it is serious about dialogue and that
it hopes for a positive outcome. It has set
conditions for dialogue which we believe the
Dalai Lama has met. The Dalai Lama has made clear
that he is not seeking separation or
independence. He has said repeatedly that he is
seeking a resolution to the situation of Tibet
within the framework of the Chinese constitution (...)".

10. EU-China dialogue on human rights, General
Affairs Council, 2327th Council meeting -
Brussels, 22-23 January 2001, para 8; see also
Human rights -- China Conclusions, General
Affairs Council, 2338th Council meeting -
Brussels, 19 March 2001, para 6; and Human rights
-- China Conclusions, General Affairs Council,
2416th Council meeting - Brussels, 11 March 2002, para 8.

11. Human rights in the world 2008 and the EU’s
policy on the matter, European Parliament, 7 May 2009

12. Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament "EU-China:
Closer partners, growing responsibilities COM(2006) 632 final

13. Fédération Internationale de la Ligue des
droits de l’Homme (FIDH), Human Rights in China
(HRIC) Joint Assessment of the EU-China Human
Rights Dialogue and Legal Expert Seminars December 2008

14. A Power Audit of EU-China relations, ECFR, April 2009

15. Statement of Kelsang Gyaltsen at the Hearing
on Tibet in the Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, 31 March 2009

16. A Power Audit of EU-China relations, ECFR, April 2009

17. EU-US Summit Joint Statement, 10 June 2008:
"We are concerned about the recent unrest in
Tibet and urge all sides to refrain from further
violence. We welcome China’s recent decision to
hold talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives.
We encourage both parties to move forward with a
substantive, constructive and results-oriented dialogue at an early date"

18. According to Chinese official statistics,
1.200 Tibetans remain unaccounted for. ICT has a
list of more than 700 prisoners detained since March 08.

19. On 9th March 2009, The Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China urges the Chinese
government to halt a wave of detentions of
journalists and open Tibet for news coverage. It
underlined that reporters from at least six news
organisation have been detained, turned back or
had their tapes confiscated in the past week as
they tried to visit Tibetan areas of Gansu,
Sichuan and Qinghai ahead of the one-year
anniversary of the unrest in Tibet. This
contravenes regulations made permanent by the
Foreign Ministry in Oct. 2008 that foreign
reporters can travel freely without seeking prior
permission everywhere outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
CTC National Office 1425 René-Lévesque Blvd West, 3rd Floor, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3G 1T7
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