Thomas P.M. Barnett |
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/author.aspx13
Jul 2009
For those in the West eager to uncover another Tiananmen-like
crackdown by Chinese authorities last week in the Xinjiang provincial
capital of Urumqi, the true story disappoints, even as it points to a
potentially far-more-destabilizing social phenomenon: the emergence of
race riots inside allegedly homogenous China. Note that President Hu
Jintao's embarrassingly rushed departure from the G-8 meeting in Italy
was not provoked by Sunday's riots by angry Uighurs, but rather by
Tuesday's even uglier revenge riots by even angrier -- and better-
armed -- Han Chinese.
The makings of this unrest should strike us Americans as painfully
familiar. The influx of settlers from the East left the poorer, less-
educated indigenous people feeling crowded out and discriminated
against in their homeland. The suddenly tougher economic times
exacerbated the resulting ethnic tension, despite government efforts
to paper over the social anger with enlightened affirmative action-
style programs. Finally, the implied sexual threat to the dominant
majority served as the match for the outbreak of vigilante "justice."
If the narrative sounds like a mélange of plots from American "old
West" and civil rights-era movies, that's because many of the same
dynamics are in play -- with Xinjiang substituting for the role of
Texas or California: too valuable in natural resources for the central
government to give up, but often too hard to control in terms of its
frontier tensions and mob violence.
Han Chinese have streamed into China's westernmost province, Xinjiang,
since the 1949 communist revolution, with the flow increasing
dramatically in recent years. Today, as the 60th anniversary of the
People's Republic approaches in October, the Han make up just over 40
percent of the province's 21 million residents. For now, the 10
million native Uighurs, who are predominantly Muslim and Turkic
speakers, hold a slim majority at just under 50 percent.
As the demographic correlation of power shifts, the resulting
accusations by the Uighurs are unsurprising, and go something like
this: The Han get all the best jobs and best opportunities, while
suppressing our culture and language. Xinjiang was a better place to
live before all the Han started pushing in. If we don't stand up, they
will simply swamp us!
The caustic comebacks from the Han sound like they were cribbed from
some Chinese version of Archie Bunker: Why should we give preferences
to the Uighurs? They don't even bother to learn Chinese -- in China!
They're also lazy, and will steal if you don't keep an eye on them.
And that, after all the tax money we've wasted trying to give them a
better, more modern life! Those people in Urumqi got what they
deserved, especially after Uighur migrant workers raped that woman in
Shaoguan. Uighurs cause trouble wherever they go in China. We simply
shouldn't have to put up with it anymore!
That the Web-distributed story alleging the rape of a factory worker
in Guangdong province turned out to be untrue just goes to show you
how deep the tension runs in Xinjiang: Despite decades of living
together in relative peace, both sides instinctively believe the other
side capable of the most egregious crimes.
Naturally, in this interconnected media age, the tension has been
elevated to an international scale, with Beijing blaming the initial
riots on outside instigators -- namely, the World Uyghur Congress
headquartered in Washington and fronted by a 62-year-old grandmother
who once served time in a Chinese prison for her political activism.
For her part, the alleged "mastermind," Rebiya Kadeer, claimed that
China's leaders engineered the resulting revenge riots. Neither
accusation strikes me as particularly credible.
Instead of floating conspiracy theories, both sides need to confront
the fundamental truth that, as the Han surpass the Uighurs in sheer
numbers in Xinjiang, racial tensions will continue to spontaneously
boil over with greater regularity. Despite government efforts to
promote "social harmony," the Han and Uighurs still live in different
worlds, with language representing a huge barrier between them.
Moreover, unlike the far-more cosmopolitan and freewheeling East
Coast, Xinjiang's economy is dominated by state-run enterprises, whose
labor practices tend toward the Dickensian.
I will give the Chinese authorities some credit here, though. Compared
to the media crackdown surrounding the Tibetan protests last year, the
government is exhibiting a stunning level of transparency this time
around. Yes, the Internet was clamped down on, but foreign journalists
have been welcomed, and news conferences by officials have been
frequent. Frankly, compared to the promises of "severe punishment"
from China's top leaders, the behavior of the local officials -- and
Chinese military troops and police -- has been appropriately
moderating, if sometimes clumsy.
There are no simple answers here, just a lot of new rules for China as
it continues to integrate itself with the larger world. But you can
forget about "Free Xinjiang!" for all the same reasons why "Free
Tibet!" is a chimera. Simply put, there is no historical logic for
founding impoverished, interior-landlocked independent nations,
because wherever we do find them in this world, they tend to be failed
states.
Instead, we can expect Beijing to maintain a strong grip on Xinjiang,
and for that strong grip to continue to elicit significant resistance
from a soon-to-be-minority local population that feels its unique
identity slipping away. All I would tell the Chinese leadership is
that they better continue improving their mitigating -- and even
accommodating -- responses to such blowback.
Why? Because as China's economic networks continue to expand around
the planet, this sort of local friction will become an ubiquitous
problem, subjecting Beijing's allegedly sophisticated "soft diplomacy"
to far greater tests -- and far more unpalatable political adjustments.
Thomas P.M. Barnett is senior managing director of Enterra Solutions
LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine.
His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After
Bush" (2009). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every
Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.